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ADF Serials Message Board > Navy Aircraft - Royal Australian Navy Fleet Air Arm > Sea Venom Wz900


Posted by: youngharry Mar 18 2016, 11:31 AM
In the long term, it probably does not change the results of an arrestor wire breakage that caused WZ900 to crash into the sea, of HMAS Melbourne in 1966, however, if we make a statement then it should be correct.
866 (WZ900 ) did not crash during night flying. It crashed in broad daylight and the Observer did eject. I was there. It was my aeroplane and I witnessed the whole event.

Posted by: Brenden S Mar 18 2016, 12:07 PM
Cheers for coming on board with us.

Posted by: Martin Edwards Mar 18 2016, 05:05 PM
G'day young Harry
Thanks for pointing out this mistake.
Unusually we were in possession of the correct details but sometimes the facts don't make it to the aircraft page.
I have corrected the Sea Venom page.
http://www.adf-serials.com.au/n4.htm

For you interest we have this;
Sea Venom Wire Break, Pilot: Eject; Observer: Fatal 28 April 1966
Pilot story: Leut John Da Costa
“A normal approach was made for an arrested landing, the Observer Lieutenant Kennel, calling the I.A.S. in the normal Sea Venom deck landing manner. The last Airspeed call I heard from Lt. Kennell immediately before arrestor wire engagement was 117 knots. The touchdown felt normal and the aircraft appeared to be lined up parallel to the centreline but slightly offset to Starboard.

A wire was engaged and initial retardation experienced but after what appeared to be approximately half wire pullout, retardation abruptly ceased and the aircraft rolled down the
deck. I immediately applied full power. I had no time to check the I.A.S. but as the aircraft left the Flight Deck and dropped the Port Wing, I realised that I did not have flying speed so called ‘Eject, Eject’. As I attempted to level the wings, the Observer jettisoned the canopy and I had the impression that he ejected immediately afterwards. By this time I had succeeded in levelling the wings and ejected myself. I felt that the aircraft was just about to or had just struck the water as I ejected. As I ejected I felt a sharp pain in the back and blow to my left foot. Entry into the water took place feet first and very shortly after ejection and was quite violent, my face mask tearing off as I entered the water.

I inflated my Life Saving Waistcoat as I submerged and immediately came to the surface. I released my parachute harness and thought I was completely disentangled until the SAR helicopter appeared and the slipstream began to blow the parachute canopy away. I found myself being dragged by the parachute until I managed to untangle a single shroud line hooked about my
neck and shoulder.

On first appearance of the SAR helicopter which was very soon after entry into the water, I disconnected my dinghy without inflating it and was picked up very shortly after clearing
myself from the parachute." At no time after ejection did I sight Lieutenant Kennell.”

He went on to say that the time between applying full power and going over the end of the flight deck was only 2 or 3 seconds; the aircraft did not remain hooked to the ship; the Sea Venom broke up immediately upon striking the water; and the ship did not stop as there were two other aircraft in the air that had to land."

Posted by: Luig Mar 21 2016, 05:57 PM
Thanks for pointing out the error 'youngharry'. Excerpt from 817 Squadron Diary below dated 28 April 1966.

Posted by: Luig Feb 5 2018, 09:43 AM
A lot of detailed information about this accident may be found here:

https://www.faaaa.asn.au/sea-venom-wz900/

Posted by: Luig Feb 7 2018, 02:25 PM
At the FAAAA URL above there are two PDFs of eye-witness statements, some describe Ted Kennell unconscious / dead in the water before disappearing (probably still attached to his seat). This letter from the pilot to SLIPSTREAM magazine dated Feb 2002 overcomes my 'received wisdom' of fifty years that was also the 'erroneous' finding of the accident board regarding Kennell.

3 page PDF made from the source letter attached now.

Slipstream PDF: https://www.faaaa.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Slipstream-Vol-13-1-Feb02.pdf

QUOTE
"...A point of contention in this matter was whether or not Ted Kennell had attempted to eject. I had told the Board of Enquiry of discussions which Ted and I had had as to the relative merits of ejecting or riding it out into the water should we have had a brake failure on deck. Despite the unlikelihood of the parachute fully deploying under such low-speed, low-altitude circumstances, I was convinced that ejection was the best bet. Ted, a big man, was inclined toward riding it out, but had made no definitive statement as to what he would do. (We had not discussed [or envisaged] the circumstances of our actual accident.)

The Board of Enquiry took that evidence into account in concluding, despite my statement that I believed that Ted had ejected, and the eyewitness reports of the SAR crew, that he had not attempted to eject and that that was the explanation for him not having survived the accident. However, after reviewing all of the evidence, including a now missing cine-film of the accident, taken from the flight deck, and taking into account some Defence scientific calculations, Navy Office subsequently disagreed with that conclusion. Unfortunately, the Navy Office file on the matter cannot now be found, but I have it on the authority of the DNAP staff officer at the time, that the following conclusions were reached:

• Ted Kennell was believed to have ejected as the aircraft was descending rapidly from flight deck level. Because of the aircraft's downward velocity, and taking into account his weight, the resultant vertical velocity due to the thrust from the ejection seat had been reduced to the extent that insufficient height would have been gained to achieve full seat separation or parachute deployment.

• My seat was believed to have fired as the aircraft struck the water and downward velocity had ceased. Accordingly, the trajectory gained from the ejection seat thrust would have been sufficient for full seat separation to occur and the parachute would have filled more or less as I struck the water ahead of the initial ditching point.

A tragic accident which is still painful in more than one way, but I am grateful to still be here to talk about it.

Regards to all who knew Ted. John Da Costa" [CDRE RAN rtd]

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