Tracker Loss Aircrew Names Anomaly

This is the entry for the loss of the Tracker at: http://www.adf-serials.com.au/n12.htm

"N12-153608 S-2E 22/11/67 352C 853 Served with 816 Sqn RAN.
Ditched 10/02/75 after night flying when doing a Bolter (missed wire and going around again) from HMAS MELBOURNE.

Crew were SBLT(P) G. C. Rulfs RAN, LEUT(O) B. J. Bromfield RAN, ASLT(O) G.J. McCormack RAN and POACM J. Krueger. [ Last two names either wrong or INCORRECT spelling - see Graphic]

The crew were all rescued unhurt...."

Attached is the Navy News page (in part) about the accident with I believe correct crew names. I do not know the source of the names above. Anyone know the reality? I do not believe Navy News would get the names wrong.

Navy News 31 Jan 1975 PDF:

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files...ary-31-1975.pdf

I remember 'Joe Kroger's' name pronounced as spelt here but would not know correct spelling however I would rely on Navy News to make the attempt to get it right. Why a different 'senso' name I do not know? Anyway it is likely that SBLT David John Palmer should be substituted for incorrect 'McCormack'.

I do not know which list is correct however so I would be pleased to be corrected if the Navy News is in fact wrong.

Attached Image

The source for the names was the FAAM via Windy Geale. I have sent you a P.M

This post has been edited by Dave Masterson on Apr 8 2014, 12:47 PM

Thanks Dave,
Here is part of the message Dave received in 2004 from another TACCO (Observer in the right hand seat - with pilot in left hand seat) who is the master tactician in flight for finding the submarine or carrying out the mission. So in the RAN only one pilot in a Tracker most times except when under training.

"...I have to say that this is my recollection as an interested party of an incident 30 years ago. I wasn’t in 853, my interest was largely because I had just launched from MELBOURNE prior to 853 recovering onboard and boltering. My recollection of the crash, the inquiries and the probable cause is as follows.

It was a very black night with no horizon at all. I recall as we launched and flew away we commented how black it was, there was no light at all. We had completed a handover of 853’s mission information, contact positions etc, and 853 switched to the ship’s frequencies for their recovery. We then received a call from the Anti Submarine Air Controller (ASAC) saying there had been a crash on deck. A few minutes later he called again and in a jovial tone said ‘no crash on deck, crash into the sea’. We then waited until much later to find out the crew had been recovered. The crash was the subject of much discussion amongst the aircrew for some years and as I had a personal involvement I did follow the deliberations.

After the crash a Board of Inquiry was convened with then LCDR Rob Partington as the President or as a senior member. Rob was an experienced Tracker pilot, ex Gannets, who was XO of the ship that recovered the crew. He went on to retire as a CDRE and sadly died early last year in an accident involving a test flight of a home built.

I don’t recall the findings of this inquiry except that I think it deduced the accident occurred because the Tacco of 853, the late Barry Bromfield, put the flaps all the way up on the bolter rather than to 1/3.

A later inquiry in about 1976/77 used the flight test results obtained by the test pilot and then OIC of AMAFTU, Ian McIntyre, which indicated that if the aircraft had been flown off the ship at the right attitude it should have had a positive rate of climb no matter what the flap setting, up or 1/3.

The 2nd inquiry explored pilot disorientation and concluded that the pilot of 853 possibly suffered from disorientation due to the acceleration off the ship under full power inducing a sensation of the aircraft pitching up. Barry Bromfield and other crew members of 853 told me that Barry had been calling to ‘get the nose up’ or words to that effect before they hit the water. If the pilot’s instrument scan wasn’t ideal he would have pushed the nose of the aircraft down to respond to his perception of the aircraft pitching up. I also recall that this was the first bolter 853’s pilot had experienced. I think this inquiry concluded disorientation as the most likely cause...."

At night out at sea the black of the night can be everywhere with no horizon to be seen. No stars - nada. It is easy to become disorientated from ordinary acceleration of the aircraft effect on the inner ear. Then when this 'spatial disorientation' kicks in the instruments must be used to fly - no reference to anything other than the trusted instruments.

The pilot would have done night hook up touch and goes as a series before his first actual night arrest and catapult. However a 'bolter' is slightly different - especially probably in a Tracker when the expectation would be to arrest first time - every time.

An aircraft can bolter from a good accurate approach because the hook skips, the ship moves and other factors - not necessarily due to a bad approach. The unexpected nature of the 'sudden bolter' perhaps brought on the initial disorientation with the unexpected (not felt for some time) effect of the acceleration - SD is a killer in jet aircraft if they are close to the ground. You will find lots of stories online about fatal SD accidents.

This post has been edited by Luig on Apr 9 2014, 07:12 AM

340Mb RAN S-2 History PDF with embedded Videos available free download.

FOLDER: S-2E-G History 21 Apr 2014 pp372

https://onedrive.live.com/?cid=CBCD63D63407...0707E6!1380

4 part RAR/EXE file combination "S-2E-G21Apr2014p372" when downloaded into same directory and .EXE double clicked will result in:

"Trackers S-2E-G 21 Apr 2014 pp372.pdf" 340Mb

OOPs from the e-mail excerpt it is not clear that the e-mailer is in fact SBLT(O) G.J. McCormack 'the TACCO who was supposedly in the S-2 in the ADF-serials incorrect data' - as he himself states in the e-mail "IT WAS NOT ME CHIEF!" (I have made that 'CHIEF' statement) :D .

I'm certain CMDR (O) G.J. McCormack RAN (retd) would like to NOT be included in the accident report - as he was NOT in the aircraft involved - but in another S-2 airborne at the time as stated in his e-mail. OK? Thanks.

WHAT ELSE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO HAVE THIS ERROR CORRECTED?

This post has been edited by Luig on Apr 22 2014, 11:17 AM

Patience Phil, there are still discrepancies to be sorted out.
Rome wasn't built in a day.

Until we have positively verified the identities and spelling I have temporarily removed all the crew member names from the Tracker page.



More concerning are the numerous reports around the net claiming that the crew of 2 were killed!
http://www.baaa-acro.com/1975/archives/cra...ralia-2-killed/
http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=27862

Barry John Bromfield, Gregory Car Rulfs and David John Palmer all show in National Archives of Australia search but as yet I cannot find any Joe Kroger, Kreuger or Krueger

I think that I have found our man!

KROEGER JOACHIM : Service Number - R93065 : Date of birth - 14 Feb 1944

From NAA Service Cards for Navy Officers, 1911-1970


So it seems Joe Kroger/Joe Krueger is actually Joachim Kroeger.
(30 years old, nearly 31 at time of accident but not 33 as stated in Navy News article)


Is everyone happy then with the crew being listed as;

Lieutenant Barry John Bromfield,
Sub-Lieutenant Gregory Car Rulfs
Sub-Lieutenant David John Palmer
Petty Officer Joe Kroeger

EXCELLENT. Many thanks for clearing up the spelling 'KROEGER'.

Have informed ASN website:

http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=27862

This post has been edited by Luig on Apr 23 2014, 06:16 AM

Nicely done Martin & Phil!

BC

The other incorrect website guy is on holiday, so I expect the info will be changed some time soonish?

At first this website (the other one) had minimal correct info. Now it has gone FERAL with incorrect names (I guess from old info here). So it goes.

I'll chase 'em up later this morning. [Have done it now and I guess the info will be updated soonish?]

Interesting that the TRACKER LOSS is written up in this PDF: (pp81-83)

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a267086.pdf (6Mb)

I'll extract the text and post it here. There is a WEIRD comment about the A4G collision (PERHAPS tongue in cheek or just misinformed):

"...A case in point is provided by two Douglas Skyhawks of the RAN which collided in flight at Nowra, NSW on 17 July 1975. The contact was gentle, inflicting only minor damage on the two aircraft, to the extent that the pilot of N13-155051 was able to land without undue difficulty...." HELL NO. Unless engine flameout and all the other stuff is 'undue difficulty' - B/S I say.

This post has been edited by Luig on Apr 24 2014, 06:37 AM

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AT ARL THE FIRST 50 YEARS J.L. KEPERT 1993

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a267086.pdf (6Mb)

14. HUMAN FACTORS... pages 81-83
"...Another way of stacking the cards is to impose an excessive work load on the pilot and the work load is never higher than when making a night landing aboard an aircraft carrier at sea. The point is illustrated by the accident to Grumman Tracker N12-153608 which crashed while attempting a night landing aboard HMAS Melbourne on 10 February 1975. The investigation of this accident was a novel experience for ARL; the request for assistance was received from the RAN more than 12 months after the accident, there was no wreckage to examine, and the investigation was, perforce, based solely on written statements by eyewitnesses.

Tracker N12-153608 was catapulted from the carrier at 2200 hours on 9 February 1975 to carry out an anti-submarine warfare close support task. The night was unusually dark with no visible horizon so that approximately three hours of the flight were spent in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). At 0323 hours the following morning, the aircraft attempted a routine landing using the mirror landing system as an approach aid. In the days preceding the accident, the mirror setting had been changed from an approach slope of 4° to 4.5° but the pilot had not been informed of this. In consequence, the approach was slightly high and fast, the aircraft failed to pick up an arrester wire, an event known as a "bolter", and it subsequently crashed into the sea approximately ten seconds later. All four crew members managed to escape from the sinking aircraft and were rescued uninjured.

[I think this is a mistaken impression FWIW about the glideslope change. Sure it changed how the aircraft approached when following the ball. However the pilot must fly the ball and not an approach that he thinks is correct; or one that he may have flown in the past - at a lower glideslope angle. I do not know why the mirror glideslope was changed and assume the LSOs were happy with the change. YET the pilot must fly the ball. "Meatball, Line Up and Airspeed" is a carrier pilot mantra. So the glideslope is higher than usual? He should not really notice. Why? Because he is flying the ball and not deck spotting. Not that anything can be seen at night - especially on this extra special dark night. Yes the pilot may have flown a high fast approach {which could result in a rampstrike - ask me now :-) } mine was high all the way but not fast but anyway it is always the same - meatball, line up and airspeed and in the case of the A4G the Optimum Angle of Attack is substituted for airspeed. Our early Trackers did not have an AoA Indicator.]

On receiving a bolter call from the Landing Safety Officer, standard procedure was for the pilot to open the throttles to full power and to establish a positive pitch up attitude, then to select undercarriage up while the Tactical Co-ordinator (Tacco) in the right hand seat raised the flaps from full to 2/3 down. One difficulty with this procedure was the need to monitor the engine instruments closely to avoid exceeding the maximum permissible boost pressure of 57 inches Hg. Since the Tracker engines were not fitted with automatic overboost protection devices, this requirement imposed an additional work load on the pilot at a critical time. According to both the pilot and Tacco, full power was achieved with the vertical gyro indicator (VGI) showing a positive pitch up attitude of 50 as the aircraft left the flight deck. The RAN Board of Inquiry accepted this evidence and concluded that the failure of the aircraft to climb away successfully resulted from an inadvertent selection of zero flap by the Tacco.

Subsequent flight trials showed that, under the accident conditions of 87 KIAS and 22,000 lb aircraft weight, the Tracker had such a large performance reserve that it could climb away at any positive pitch angle from zero to 7.5° regardless of flap position. Faced with this evidence, the Board of Inquiry withdrew its earlier findings and requested further investigation.

ARL began its investigation by noting that the Tracker had provision for two modes of flap operation. In the normal retraction mode, an orifice in the hydraulic circuit restricted the flow to limit the rate of flap retraction. The size of the orifice was apparently selected to provide a flap retraction rate that optimised the initial climb performance of the aircraft. That is, the flap retraction rate was matched to the usual acceleration. Selection of zero flap would therefore result in better aircraft performance than the selection of 2/3 flap as required by standard operating procedures. This was confirmed by flight trials. In the fast retraction mode, which required the aircraft to be supported by the undercarriage, the orifice was bypassed to allow fast retraction.

Having eliminated flap operation as the cause of the accident, only two possible alternatives could be postulated, viz. loss of power and incorrect pitch attitude. Both the pilot and Tacco stated that full power was applied and maintained. Some external witnesses were less certain but none suggested that the sound of the engines had varied considerably to indicate a substantial loss of power. Again, flight trials showed a large power reserve such that satisfactory climb performance could still be achieved with boost pressures reducing rapidly to 42 inches Hg. There was a consistent thread running through the statements by external witnesses that the aircraft attitude was flatter than normal with estimates ranging from level to slightly nose down, e.g. 'definitely not a climbing attitude at any stage'. Even the Tacco and one of the crewmen in the rear of the aircraft sensed that the attitude was abnormally flat. Yet both the pilot and Tacco were adamant that the VGI was registering 50 nose up.

To human factors experts at ARL, this accident had all the hallmarks of the "dark night take-off accident". This term is used to describe an accident which results from the failure to establish a positive rate of climb following take-off in conditions which deprive the pilot of external visual cues. In this situation, the pilot senses a push in the back but is unable to distinguish between the forces resulting from linear acceleration and gravity. Hence, horizontal acceleration is easily misinterpreted as a pitch up attitude (somatogravic illusion). Under these conditions, it is vital for the pilot to monitor his flight instruments closely, particularly with respect to pitch attitude and rate of climb. This is all very well but the instruments must be read correctly. If the pilot is suffering from disorientation, there is a strong tendency to see what ought to be there rather than what is actually there.

Spatial disorientation implies a false perception of attitude and motion. The four conditions which lead to its onset were all present in the case in question, viz:

a. a state of anxiety or mental arousal prevalent for some minutes prior to the event,
b. control of the aircraft had involved a motor task of one or both hands,
c. immediately prior to the event, the pilot had been distracted from the immediate task of controlling the aircraft attitude,
d. horizontal acceleration had rotated the apparent gravity vector.

Certainly in the period preceding the accident, the pilot was highly aroused on the mirror approach and had been manually controlling the aircraft; the bolter situation, bolter call and undercarriage actions provided a distraction from the attitude control task and the horizontal velocity was changing.

Applied Report 78 concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the pilot was affected by unrecognised disorientation associated with somatogravic illusion and flew the aircraft into the sea. Factors thought to have contributed were:

a. the exceptionally dark night,
b. the pilot's unawareness of the change of settings to the mirror landing aid,
c. the pilot's lack of any previous bolter experience,
d. the need to monitor engine instruments instead of the VGI as the aircraft was rotated.

The VGI readings stated to have been present during the overshoot probably were incorrectly perceived because of the visual disturbances and mental confusion characteristically associated with disorientation episodes."

This post has been edited by Luig on Apr 24 2014, 04:05 PM

Here is a good explanation about the illusions one can suffer in flight.

Dark night takeoffs and the “false climb” illusion Dr Dougal Watson

http://www.pilotfriend.com/aeromed/medical/false_climb.htm

"Aircraft have been destroyed and many aviators, and their passengers, have died as a result of the “false climb” illusion. Unlike the approach and landing illusions (See ‘Illusions during the approach and landing’) that rarely result in more misery than a hard landing or a missed approach, this one is a killer. Understanding the mechanisms behind the “false climb” illusion is quite difficult, but is an important first step in avoiding becoming one of its victims.

The false climb illusion is a classic example of the limitations of our senses, especially sight, balance, and touch, during flight. This illusion occurs when our otolith balance organs (See ‘Senses during flight’) provide misleading information to the brain and there isn’t enough information from the eyes to correct the error...."

This website has made some changes whilst having others incorrect - these have been highlighted by my e-mail response to webmaster (who was away until recently):

http://www.baaa-acro.com/1975/archives/cra...ralia-2-killed/

WEBsite Now Updated: 02 May 2014

This post has been edited by Luig on May 2 2014, 12:59 AM

RAF 'Air Clues' Safety Magazine May 2014 Edition has this PDF story about the somatogravic illusion/spatial disorientation problem for taking off/climbing.

Attached File ( Number of downloads: 444 )
 Spatial_Disorientation_RAF_Air_Clues_Safety_Mag_Early_2014_PRN.pdf